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Do Juries Add Value? Evidence
from an Empirical Study of Jury
Trial Waiver Clauses in Large
Corporate Contracts
Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P. Miller*
We study jury trial waivers in a data set of 2,816 contracts contained as
exhibits in Form 8-K filings by reporting corporations during 2002. Because
these contracts are associated with events deemed material to the financial
condition of SEC-reporting firms, they likely are carefully negotiated by
sophisticated, well-informed parties and thus provide presumptive evidence
about the value associated with the availability of jury trials. A minority of
contracts, about 20 percent, waived jury trials. An additional 9 percent of
contracts had arbitration clauses that effectively preclude jury trials though
the reason for arbitration clauses need not specifically relate to juries. We
explore three groups of factors to explain the pattern of jury trial waivers:
(1) contract-specific factors: the subject matter of a contract, a measure of
its standardization, choice of law, and choice of forum, (2) contracting-party
factors: domestic versus international status, place of business, place of
incorporation, attorney locale, and industry, and (3) factors external to the
contracts and parties: perceptions of jury fairness in the forum specified in
the contract and the relative length of jury and bench trial queues in that
forum. Contract type is significantly associated with jury trial waivers. For
example, over 50 percent of security agreements and over 60 percent of
credit commitments waived jury trials. In contrast, 5 percent of employment
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contracts, 2 percent of bond indentures, and 3.5 percent of pooling service
agreements waived jury trials. The presence of a forum selection clause,
greater contract standardization, and perceived fairness of juries are signifi-
cantly associated with jury trial waivers. Over 80 percent of the contracts
designating Illinois as a forum contained jury trial waivers whereas less than
half the contracts designating New York as a forum, and only about one-
third of the contracts designating California, Texas, or Florida as a forum,
contained waiver clauses. Jury trial waivers were not more common in
international contracts. Our results suggest that, contrary to a widespread
perception about the alleged inadequacies of juries in complex business
cases, sophisticated actors may perceive that juries add value to dispute
resolution.
I. Introduction
Commercial contracts frequently contain agreements about how the parties
wish to resolve disputes that may arise under the contract. One ex ante
provision for dispute resolution is an agreement to waive the right to a jury.
Such waivers will ordinarily be enforced, provided they are found to be
knowing and deliberate.1 Given widespread beliefs that juries do not
1The Seventh Amendment provides federal litigants with a right to jury trial in civil cases. U.S.
Const. amend. VII. Many state constitutions also guarantee civil jury trial rights. See, e.g., Cal.
Const. art. I, § 16.
The right to a jury can be waived. In federal civil cases, for example, the right to jury trial is
waived if not specifically demanded in timely fashion, and may also be waived by consent of both
parties. FRCP Rules 38, 39. Some states, however, allow the court to reject a jury trial waiver and
impose a jury on the parties in a civil case. See, e.g., Miss. Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b). Juries
may also be waived in criminal cases, providing the waiver is knowing and deliberate. Such
waivers are implicit in plea bargaining. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
Federal courts also enforce predispute contractual waivers of jury trial. Waivers are implicit in
agreeing to arbitration and courts generally enforce such waivers under general principles of
contract law without requiring a heightened showing of consent. See, e.g., Caley v. Gulfstream
Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2005). But see Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses,
Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 381 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding arbitration agreement waiver of jury right to
higher standard than ordinary contract principles). Federal courts also enforce predispute jury
trial waivers outside the context of arbitration agreements, at least if the agreement is knowing
and voluntary. See Debra T. Landis, Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Civil Cases, 92
A.L.R. Fed. 688 (2003); Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build it, They Will Come: Contracts to
Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 579 (2007);
Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832 (4th Cir. 1986); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,
757 F.2d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 1985); Rodenbur v. Kaufmann, 320 F.2d 679, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2002). But see Deborah J.
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perform well in complex commercial cases,2 we might suppose that ex ante
jury trial waivers would be nearly universally observed in major business
contracts.
This article reports on the first large-scale empirical study of jury trial
waivers in large commercial contracts.3 We find that such waivers are far from
universal. Explicit jury trial waivers were contained in only about 20 percent
of the more than 2,800 contracts in our data set. Another 9 percent of
contracts contained mandatory arbitration clauses. Such clauses are likely
adopted for reasons other than jury avoidance. If their only purpose were to
avoid a jury, this goal could be achieved more parsimoniously with a simple
jury waiver.4 But even if arbitration clauses are classified as jury waivers, a
substantial majority of the contracts—over 70 percent—do not preclude
juries.
What causes the relative paucity of jury trial waivers in our data? Pos-
sible explanations include agency costs, strategic considerations, and trans-
actions costs. It is also possible—perhaps likely, though difficult to prove
directly—that the parties omit jury trial waivers because they believe poten-
tial jury availability adds value to the contract. Because the contracting
parties in our data set are sophisticated business entities negotiating over
Matties, A Case for Judicial Self-Restraint in Interpreting Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in
Federal Court, 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 431, 462–63 (1997).
Most state courts also enforce predispute jury trial waivers. See Jay M. Zitter, Contractual Jury
Trial Waivers in State Civil Cases, 42 A.L.R.5th 53, 71 (1996); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004); Mall, Inc. v. Robbins, 412 So. 2d 1197, 1200 (Ala. 1982); L & R
Realty v. Connecticut Nat’l Bank, 715 A.2d 748, 754–55 (Conn. 1998); Malan Realty Investors,
Inc. v. Harris, 953 S.W.2d 624, 626–27 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam); Lowe Enters.
Residential Partners, L.P. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 40 P.3d 405 (Nev. 2002); Rhode Island
Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp. v. Coffey & Martinelli, Ltd., 821 A.2d 222, 226 (R.I. 2003). Two
states—California and Georgia—reject predispute waivers as inconsistent with applicable stat-
utes. See Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479 (Ca. 2005); Bank S., N.A. v.
Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. 1994).
2See text accompanying infra notes 62–82.
3See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation by Contract Design, 115 Yale
L.J. 814, 857 (2006) (noting that contract law scholars “focus principally on the substantive
terms” of contracts rather than on ex ante mechanisms for enforcement, and characterizing the
investigation of such mechanisms as a “rich avenue for future research”).
4See J. Michael McGuire & Adam S. Belzberg, Are Jury Trial Waivers Coming of Age? 38 Md. B.J.
25 (2006) (employers can avoid juries by jury trial waivers without arbitration clauses in employ-
ment contracts).
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important contracts, their revealed preferences about jury trials provides
evidence bearing on the ongoing debate about the value of civil juries.
Given the variation in jury trial waivers, the question arises whether one
can explain their pattern. Two major classes of factors—those internal to the
contracts themselves and those external to the contracts—might help
explain the pattern. At the descriptive level, we find strong associations
between internal contractual factors and the rate of jury trial waivers. Con-
tract type is the most powerful factor in describing the variation in jury
trial waiver rates. Credit contracts—credit commitments and security
agreements—have the highest rate of jury waiver clauses, both over 50
percent. In contrast, about 5 percent of employment contracts contain jury
waivers and about 10 percent of licensing contracts contain waivers. Another
factor internal to the contracts, the degree of standardization, also is associ-
ated with jury trial waivers. Contracts with low standardization are associated
with lower waiver rates. The presence of a forum selection clause in the
contract is also associated with jury trial waiver rates.
External forces on waiver clauses can be subdivided. Some are charac-
teristics of the contracting parties—place of business, place of incorporation,
attorney locale, and industry all might relate to the waiver rate. Other
external factors are more clearly exogenous to the parties and the contract.
These external factors include the perceived fairness of juries in the likely
litigation forum. Parties may systematically shun juries in locales in which
they perceive juries to be unfair. Expected costs of jury trials may also vary
across geographical areas. Locales in which jury trials have a longer queue
than bench trials increase the cost of jury trials relative to bench trials5 and
may be associated with higher jury trial waiver rates. We find an association
between perceived jury fairness and jury trial waiver rates but no robust
association between the difference in jury and bench trial queues and waiver
rates.
Section II of this article describes the relevant background to studying
jury trial waivers and articulates the hypotheses relating to internal and
external influences that we test. Section III describes the data and Sections
IV and V report the results. Section VI discusses the results and Section VII
concludes.
5State prejudgment interest rules affect the degree to which delay associated with jury trials
harms plaintiffs relative to defendants. Ex ante we can assume that both contracting parties
prefer prompt rather than protracted dispute resolution.
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II. Background and Hypotheses
The questions of juries’ value and accuracy, and in particular whether juries
can competently function in complex commercial litigation, have sparked
substantial academic and political debate. The business community has been
hostile toward juries in tort cases, viewing juries as one of the principal
causes, along with greedy plaintiffs, unscrupulous attorneys, and activist
judges, of a purported litigation explosion that supposedly undermines the
social fabric and the economy. Although this view has questionable empirical
support,6 employers,7 large corporations,8 and residential landlords9 (among
others) perceive themselves to be at risk of excessive or arbitrary jury verdicts
based on hostility to deep-pocket defendants or sympathy for injured plain-
tiffs. According to this view,10 juries increase the risks of trials because they
decide on the basis of legally irrelevant factors rather than according to the
evidence and applicable law.11 Fairness concerns are accompanied by the
perception that jury trials generally cost more than judge trials. Jury trials
require juror selection, possible use of jury consultants, more complex evi-
dentiary and in limine issues, and a possibly longer period to come to trial.12
6For a discussion (and rebuttal) of this view, see Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of
Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1255, 1266 (2005). See also authorities cited
infra notes 77–82.
7See Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, Disp. Resol. J., Jan. 1997,
at 8, 78–79.
8Galanter, supra note 6, at 1266.
9Jury trial waivers are strongly recommended for landlords in residential lease agreements, on
the theory that juries are likely to side with tenants as against deep-pocket landlords. See Alvin
L. Arnold & Jeanne O’Neill, Real Estate Leasing Practice Manual § 40:11 (2006) (“waiver by the
lessee of a right to trial by jury” often appears in leases).
10This view appears to be widely shared among corporate executives and business lawyers. John
Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers’ and Executives’ Opinions, 3
Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1, 51–52 (1998).
11See Galanter, supra note 6, at 1266–67.
12Federal jury-tried cases are on the docket for shorter periods than judge-tried cases. Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Which is Speedier? 79 Judicature 176
(Jan.–Feb. 1996); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcend-
ing Empiricism: Trial by Jury or Judge, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1124, 1135–37 (1992). State court jury
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Thus, independent of perceptions of the perceived quality of juries’ perfor-
mance, most observers likely would regard jury trials as more costly than
bench trials.
Much of the controversy about jury trials has pertained to cases
between injured plaintiffs and large businesses because businesses especially
fear juries’ treatment in cases with sympathetic individual plaintiffs. Such
cases are unlikely to arise under the contracts in our sample, with the
exception of employment contracts. The studied contracts are largely
between substantial corporate entities. Nevertheless, fear of juries may be
observed even in corporate-dominated contracts. Juries have awarded very
large damages in disputes involving businesses,13 and business litigants may
fear that juries cannot understand the legal or factual issues in a complex
trials are on the docket longer than federal court jury trials. Theodore Eisenberg, John Goerdt,
Brian Ostrom & David Rottman, Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statistical
Portrait, 19 Seattle L. Rev. 433, 449 (1996). Actual time in trial is on average longer in jury-tried
cases than in judge-tried cases. Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Civil Justice Survey of State
Courts, 2001: Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001 (April 2004), at 8 (4.3 days
vs. 1.9 days).
13These awards, like many large awards, often are reduced or reversed. See, e.g., TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 464 (1993) (jury awarded $10 million in business
dispute); Micro/Vest v. Computerland (estimated $400 million jury award), as reported in
Computerland, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1985, and in Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive
Damages: How Juries Decide, 33 J. Legal Stud. 1, 7–8 (2006); 50-Off Stores, Inc. v. Banques
Paribas (Suisse), S.A., 180 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 1999) (jury awarded in excess of $150 million in
compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages; punitive award struck on appeal); City of
Hope Nat’l Med. Ctr. v. Genentech, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234, 238 (Cal. App. 2004)
($300,164,130 compensatory damages and $200 million in punitive damages awarded in patent
royalty dispute), review granted, 105 P.3d 543 (Cal. 2005); Rubicon Petroleum Inc. v. Amoco
Prod. Co., as reported in Amoco Loses Oilfield Suit, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1993 ($417 million jury
award); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Six Flags Over Georgia, LLC, 563 S.E.2d 178 (Ga. App.
2002) (sustaining $257 million punitive award), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 977 (2003); Pioneer
Commercial Funding Corp. v. American Fin. Mortgage Corp., 855 A.2d 818 (Pa. 2004) (striking
large jury award); COC Servs., Ltd. v. CompUSA, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App. 2004), review
denied (June 9, 2006) (striking large punitive damages award); Amoco Chem. Co. v. Certain
Underwriter’s at Lloyd’s of London, 1996 WL 407855 (Cal. App.) (reversing large jury award);
IGEN Int’l, Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 335 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 2003) (reducing award of
about $505 million by over 90 percent). In MMAR Group, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 187 F.R.D. 282
(S.D. Tex. 1999), a jury awarded $220,720,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. A retrial
was ordered based on plaintiff discovery abuse and it is reported that MMAR eventually chose
not to pursue the case. David McHam, Law & the Media in Texas: Handbook for Journalists,
available at 〈http://www.texaspress.com/Lawpress/LawMedia/Libel/TexasLibelCases.htm〉.
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civil case.14 For purposes of testing hypotheses in this article, we rely on the
perception that businesses are on average expected to be anti-jury. But the
real-world operation of the legal system casts doubt on any monolithic view
of juries. Depending on the circumstances of a case, business defendants
may choose jury trials and plaintiffs’ attorneys may avoid them.15
A. Jury Trial Waivers Generally
Businesses’ fear of juries’ fairness, accuracy, and costs generates the hypoth-
esis that, in a data set of contracts between sophisticated business entities, we
will always, or nearly always, observe jury trial waivers. Correspondingly, the
absence of a jury trial waiver clause suggests that the parties viewed jury trial
availability as a positive benefit, or were indifferent as between jury and
bench trials. The incidence of jury trial waivers provides a rough measure of
the degree to which preserving access to juries is perceived as promoting
efficiency or fairness in dispute resolution.
Hypothesis: Sophisticated parties will (nearly) always opt to waive jury trials.
B. Contract-Specific Factors
Commentators have suggested that arbitration clauses will be preferred,
relative to litigation, when the legal rules are clear.16 Similarly, contracting
parties who seek certainty may prefer judicial adjudication to avoid “noisy”
14Consider, for example, the issues presented in corporate control contests. See Thomas Petz-
inger, Jr., Oil and Honor: The Texaco-Pennzoil Wars (1987) (multibillion dollar jury award in
corporate control battle).
15For example, the plaintiffs’ legal strategy in the tobacco cases that generated the largest
settlement in litigation history was initially designed to employ Mississippi’s chancery division, in
which there would be no jury. Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General
Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 Tulane L. Rev. 1859, 1860
n.2 (2000); Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement,
33 Ga. L. Rev. 847, 894 (1999). In the Master Settlement Agreement, the defendants agreed to
pay more than $200 billion, fully protected against inflation, to the states. See 〈http://
www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa〉.
16For discussion of the arbitration clauses, see Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in Publicly-Held
Companies’ Contracts, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 335 (2007); see William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. Legal Stud. 235, 249 (1979).
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juries that are perceived as more likely to misjudge clear cases. Contracting
parties may believe, ex ante, that their litigation positions will be reasonable
and strong. A party who expects to have a strong case may opt for the
presumably more reliable judge to vindicate its position.17 The tendency to
believe in the correctness of one’s position may be stronger for standardized
contracts than in the case of contracts open to more interpretation. We
therefore should tend to observe jury trial waiver clauses in standardized
contracts.18
More generally, different contract types provide varying incentives for
the parties to allow possible jury adjudication. An employment contract may
raise fears in an employer’s mind (or hope in the employee’s mind) of a jury
awarding huge amounts to a sympathetic employee. An underwriting agree-
ment between a securities issuer and an underwriter may trigger less fear of
a jury siding with a sympathetic plaintiff.
17Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1477, 1501
(1999); Clermont & Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge, Transcending Empiricism, supra note 12,
at 1135–37.
18The degree to which a contract is relational may influence the appeal of jury trials. “Presum-
ably, expert juries are far superior to lay juries in recognizing and articulating customary
practices that govern particular transactions.” Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in
Relational Contract, in Relational Contract Theory: Unanswered Questions, A Symposium in
Honor of Ian R. MacNeil, 94 Nw. Univ. L. Rev. 847, 871 (2000). Expertise in the relevant
contract field appeals to contracting parties when the customary practices associated with
relational contracts are likely to be at issue. They might prefer bench trials to jury trials on the
theory that judges are more like experts than are juries. But see Ian R. MacNeil, Relational
Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, in Symposium, supra, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 877, 906
(2000) (“Even in equity, such courts [of general jurisdiction with their nonspecialist judges] are
relatively poorly equipped to deal with implementation of living-contract norms, as compared to
mediators, arbitrators, or specialist administrative agencies.”). Contracting parties may believe a
group of jurors is more likely to implement “living-contract norms” than a nonspecialized judge.
It is thus unclear whether one should expect relational contracts to be associated with jury trial
waivers. This theoretical ambiguity is accompanied by our inability to systematically determine
whether a contract is relational. A settlement, for example, may mark the termination of a
short-term or long-term relation or may be the harbinger of a continued relation. We never-
theless crudely coded for relational status based on contract categories. We coded the following
contract categories as more likely to be relational: credit commitments, employment, licensing,
pooling service agreements, and security agreements, and the following categories as less likely
to be relational: asset sales, bond indentures, mergers, securities purchase agreements, settle-
ments, and underwritings. In models not reported here, we found a positive significant asso-
ciation between relational-contract status and jury trial waiver. The results are a bit difficult to
interpret. For low standardization contracts, relational contracts waive juries less. For high
standardization contracts, relational contracts waive juries more. The latter result trumps the
former because many more contracts are characterized as relational than nonrelational.
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Hypotheses:
1. Jury waiver clauses will be more commonly observed when contracts are standardized
than when they are individually negotiated.
2. Jury waiver clauses will vary by contract type.
A contract that designates a forum opts in to a jury pool. Expectations
about the potential jury pool ought to be associated with decisions about jury
trial waiver clauses. We therefore expect jury trial waiver rates to vary by
choice of forum. The state law chosen, like the forum, may reflect views
about juror characteristics in the jurisdiction chosen compared to other
jurisdictions. If the parties believe a state’s juries are efficient and fair, that
might reduce the costs of litigation and provide a reason to designate a
jurisdiction as the choice of law.
Hypothesis: Jury waiver clauses will vary by contract choice of forum and choice of law.
C. Party-Specific Factors
Juries are viewed as especially threatening to “outsiders.” Non-U.S. parties to
contracts likely fear the U.S. legal system andmay be especially fearful of U.S.
juries. For example, one reason for the use of arbitration in commercial
contracts is that people distrust foreign countries’ legal systems.19 Foreign
contracting parties, unaccustomed to legal systems with civil jury trials, would
especially fear jury trials.
Hypothesis: Jury trial waivers will be observed more frequently for international contracts
than for domestic contracts.
A party’s business location is logically relevant to jury trial waivers
because business location relates to where events under a contract might
occur. The location of events influences the governing law and expected
adjudication forum and, therefore, influences the jury pool that contracting
parties expect to encounter. Similarly, a company’s state of incorporation
should be associated with the likelihood of it being sued in that state. Many
19See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Privatizing Civil Justice: Commercial Arbitration and the
Civil Justice System, 9 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 578 (2000). But empirical evidence about U.S. court
mistreatment of foreigners is lacking. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or
Xenophobia in American Courts? Before and After 9/11, 4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 441 (2007);
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 Harv. L. Rev.
1120 (1996).
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causes of action may be brought in a company’s state of incorporation.20 The
incorporation state thus should be associated with increased risk of adjudi-
cation in a state’s courts and exposure to the state’s jury pools.
Choice of forum, choice of law, place of business, and place of incor-
poration can directly influence the expected jury pool. Each of these char-
acteristics directly relates to the state in which events leading to adjudication
will occur. Attorney locale likely exerts its influence indirectly, through its
association with one or more of these four geographical factors. The con-
tracting attorney’s locale is especially likely to be associated with choice of
law, choice of forum, and place of business.21 For example, in merger con-
tracts, New York attorneys are more likely than other attorneys to specify a
litigation forum.22 An attorney’s location could influence whether a jury trial
waiver clause is used if local practice influences use of such a clause.
Hypothesis: Jury waiver clauses will vary by place of business and place of incorporation.
It is less clear whether jury trial waiver rates should be expected to be
associated with particular industries. Some industries likely have developed
more of a tendency than others to include jury waivers. The reasons for
variation across industries likely mirror some of the reasons for
intercontract-type variation. An industry with more standardized contracts
might seek to avoid purportedly noisy juries more than industries with more
varying contracts.
Hypothesis: Jury waiver clauses will vary across industries.
D. External Factors
Several factors might generate interstate variation in jury trial waiver rates.
The presumed cost savings of avoiding juries might vary across states. Case
processing time, a proxy for costs, varies across locales.23 A busy metropolitan
20E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (for venue purposes, a corporation is “deemed to reside in any
judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction”).
21Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical
Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1975 (2006).
22Id.
23For example, our analysis of the Bureau of Justice Statistics data covering trials in 46 counties
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court system may take years longer to complete a jury-tried case compared to
a bench-tried case. The delay attributed to jury trials has long been associ-
ated with jury trial waiver.24 Rural court systems may have little or no backlog
for either kind of trial. Empirical evidence indicates that parties choose
between judge and jury trial in part based on the difference in the two trial
modes’ case processing time.25 The local difference between the jury trial
queue and the bench trial queue, holding other factors constant, should be
associated with the rate of jury trial waivers. The greater the positive differ-
ence between expected jury and bench time to adjudication, the higher the
expected jury trial waiver rate.
One also expects an association between the perceived fairness of a
state’s juries and the rate of jury trial waivers in contracts connected to that
state. A direct connection to a state’s jury pool is through a forum selection
clause. Our data allow ranking states based on the jury trial waiver rates of
contracts connected to the states. The Chamber of Commerce of the United
States annually ranks states’ juries’ fairness.26 If perceptions of jury fairness
explain jury trial waiver rates, states perceived to have the least fair juries
should have the highest rates of jury trial waivers.
State-level rankings have an important limitation. Juries are selected at
the county or judicial district level, not at the state level. Using states as the
unit of observation, for example, groups rural upstate New York counties
with the Bronx and Manhattan. These geographic units obviously may differ
in their litigation and jury characteristics. Nevertheless, the Chamber’s
ranking exists at the state level and supplies an empirically testable
hypothesis.
Hypotheses:
1. Jury waiver clauses will be more commonly observed when adjudication will be in states
with longer adjudication time for jury trials than for bench trials.
in 2001, discussed at text accompanying infra notes 49–54, indicates that the mean number of
months from filing to disposition was 44.4 in Worcester, Massachusetts and 11.3 in Fairfield,
Connecticut.
24Hans Zeisel, The Jury and Court Delay, 328 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 46 (1960).
25Clermont & Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge, Transcending Empiricism, supra note 12, at
1145–48.
26E.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce State Liability Systems Ranking Study, Final Report, Jan. 11,
2002 (Study No. 14966).
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2. Jury waiver clauses will be more commonly observed in contracts connected to states
perceived as having unfair juries.
Some important factors affecting whether to waive a jury trial are not
readily observable. For example, the waiver decision in a specific contract
depends on the parties’ perceptions of the relative advantages to them of
jury versus judge adjudication. Perceived advantages may stem from local
characteristics, from perceptions of judges and juries, from projections
about where adjudication might occur, from contract-specific relative cost
projections, and from other factors not observable by us.
III. The Data
The data consist of 11 types of contracts contained as exhibits to Form 8-K
“current report” filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
for several months in 2002, plus a miscellaneous contract category desig-
nated as “Other.” Reporting firms must file Form 8-K to disclose, inter alia,
material agreements that have not previously been reported by the com-
pany.27 For 11 contract categories, six months of contracts, covering the
period January 1 to June 30, 2002, were studied. For merger contracts, the
study covered a seven-month period from January 1 to July 31, 2002.28 We
searched for all Form 8-K filings and coded the material contracts that were
exhibits to the filings. The resulting sample consisted of 2,816 contracts.29
27SEC Form 8-K, Current Report, Item 1.01 (Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement). 17
C.F.R. § 229.601(a) suggests that a Form 8-K exhibit is required when relevant to the Form 8-K
current report filing. “A Form 8-K Exhibit is required only if relevant to the subject matter
reported on the Form 8-K report.” Id. (n.5 to exhibit table).
28The expanded period for merger contracts exploits our earlier work on choice of law and
choice of forum in merger contracts. Eisenberg & Miller, Merger, supra note 21.
29Some material contracts may appear in Form 10-K filings and not in Form 8-K filings, but we
found that Form 8-K exhibits more consistently yielded material contracts than did Form 10-K
exhibits. For example, the following LexisNexis EDGAR PLUS search: Exhibit and (“material
contract”) and FILING-DATE aft (12/31/2001) and FILING-DATE BEF (2/1/2002) and
FORM-TYPE (10-K), yielded 564 documents with references to material contracts but most
contracts are outside the time period of interest and many contracts are noted but not attached
as exhibits. In contrast, the following search: Exhibit and (“material contract”) and FILING-
DATE aft (12/31/2001) and FILING-DATE BEF (2/1/2002) and FORM-TYPE (8-K), yielded
758 documents, almost all of which are in the time period of interest. We think it unlikely that
differences in the patterns of contract constituting exhibits to Forms 8-K and 10-K would
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Table 1 lists the types and contracts studied and the number of con-
tracts with information about the presence of a jury trial waiver clause. Most
of the contract types are self-explanatory. “Pooling and servicing” contracts
are used in mortgage pass-through and other asset-backed securities arrange-
ments; they represent agreements under which an owner transfers receiv-
ables to a trustee that holds title to and collects the income from the assets
and passes the funds through to investors.30
Securities purchase agreements were the most frequent contract type
(excluding the residual category “Other”) and accounted for 16.4 percent of
materially bias our results. The Form 8-K search also yields many duplicative documents. For
example, America West Holdings Corp. had 12 filings on January 31, 2002, eight of which
contain “Material Contracts” exhibits and four of which contain “Rights of Security Holders”
exhibits. These appear to relate to an integrated transaction arising out of U.S. Airways’
bankruptcy. So not all exhibits to Form 8-K were included in our sample.
30E.g., Circuit City Credit Card Master Trust, Form 8-K, Exh. 4.2, Amended and Restated Master
Pooling Service Agreement, Dated as of December 31, 2001, filed Jan. 31, 2002, Doc. No.
02523859, at 21–22. See generally Thomas E. Planck, The Security of Securitization and the
Future of Security, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1655 (2004). Trust agreements establish these trusts. E.g.,
First Consumers National Bank, Form 8-K, Exh. 4.3, Trust Agreement Between First Consumers
Credit Corporation, as Seller, and Bankers Trust Company, as Owner Trustee, Dated as of
March 1, 2001, and amended and restated as of December 31, 2001, filed Jan. 31, 2002, Doc. No.
02524022. One assumes that no jury trial right exists for many issues arising under trust
agreements because of trusts’ link to equity jurisdiction. E.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S.
248, 256 (1993) (“at common law, the courts of equity had exclusive jurisdiction over virtually
all actions by beneficiaries for breach of trust”); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500
(1959) (addressing relation between a claim’s historical origins and the right to jury trial). Trust
agreements may have less need for jury trial waivers than contracts that can be enforced by
actions at law. We exclude trust agreements from this study because jury trials would be
unavailable for many trust-related disputes that sought traditional equitable relief.
Table 1: Types of Contracts Studied (Number of
Contracts in Parentheses)
Asset sale/purchase (314) Other (464)
Bond indentures (155) Pooling and servicing (173)
Credit commitments (217) Securities purchase (461)
Employment (111) Security agreements (37)
Licensing (48) Settlements (72)
Mergers (412) Underwriting (352)
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS data-
base, January 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other
than mergers and January 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger
contracts.
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the total of 2,816 contracts. Credit-related contracts—bond indentures,
credit commitments, pooling and servicing agreements, and security
agreements—accounted for about another 21 percent of the contracts.
Merger contracts were about 15 percent of the sample, but note that they
had one extra month of coverage in the data. Together, the contract types
offer a reasonably rich variety of relations. Several types, including the
credit-related contracts, obviously involve substantial financial institutions.
Others types, asset sale/purchase and merger contracts, involve corporate
restructurings. Settlements involve resolution of disputes. Employment con-
tracts offer insights into jury waiver clauses in agreements between key
individual employees and large corporate employers.
IV. Bivariate Results
We test the hypotheses that waivers of jury trial will be: (1) regularly observed
in contracts involving sophisticated business entities, (2) more frequently
observed in standardized as compared with individually negotiated con-
tracts, (3) associated with choice of forum or choice of law, (4) more fre-
quently observed in international contracts, (5) associated with place of
business, place of incorporation, or attorney locale, (6) associated with
industrial classification, (7) more frequently observed in states regarded as
having less fair juries, and (8) more frequently observed in states with longer
queues to jury trials relative to bench trials.
A. Frequency of Jury Trial Waivers by Contract-Specific Factors
1. Type of Contract
Table 2 shows that sophisticated actors do not systematically flee juries.
Column 2 indicates that only about 20 percent of more than 2,800 contracts
waive jury trials. Substantial variation exists across contract types in waiver
rates. Jury trials were waived in about 2–6 percent of bond indenture,
employment, pooling service, and underwriting contracts, but in about 65
percent of credit commitments and 54 percent of security agreements.
Columns 3 and 4 account for the relation between arbitration clauses
and jury trial access. Arbitration clauses implicitly waive any right to jury trial.
However, unlike explicit jury trial waivers, which are hostile to juries, arbi-
tration clauses opt out of all litigation. So an arbitration clause may reflect a
dislike of judges as decisionmakers instead of or in addition to juries, or a
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wish to avoid other aspects of civil trials not associated with the jury. Accord-
ingly, an arbitration clause is a form of jury trial waiver, subject to the caveat
that foregoing trials likely is not driven by the wish to avoid juries. Otherwise,
the parties could simply waive the jury without using an arbitration clause.31
Columns 3 and 4 show results if one equates arbitration clauses with
jury trial waivers. The waiver rate then increases from 19.9 percent to 28.9
percent,29 but the vast majority of contracts continue not to waive jury trials.
Characterization of the arbitration clauses does not materially affect the
contract categories that most frequently expressly waive jury trials—credit
commitments and security agreements. However, other contract categories
do materially change. Employment contracts go from 5.4 percent to 38.7
percent jury trial waivers, and notable increases result for licensing and
settlement agreements.
2. Contract Standardization
We hypothesized that increasing contract standardization is positively asso-
ciated with jury trial waiver rates. Prior work found an inverse association
between contract standardization and the use of arbitration clauses.32 We
again use an objective measure of standardization, the distribution of the
choice of law pattern for each contract type. A contract type that regularly
specifies one choice of law likely has achieved greater standardization than a
class of contract that designates many choices of law.33 As shown below, the
results of categorizing using our standardization measure appear quite plau-
sible. Highly regularized financial transactions, such as pooling and servicing
agreements and trust agreements, score high in standardization. Less regu-
larized transactions, such as settlements and licensing agreements, have low
standardization.
We assess choice-of-law-based concentration to proxy contract stan-
dardization by focusing on three states, New York, Delaware, and California.
31Interestingly, we find no significant difference in the rate of jury trial waivers based on whether
an arbitration clause was included in the contract: 20.5 percent of 2,449 contracts without
arbitration clauses waived jury trial compared to 17.0 percent of 295 contracts with arbitration
clauses (p = 0.166). Excluding contracts with arbitration clauses from the calculation yields a
waiver rate of 20.5 percent.
32Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 16.
33As we earlier noted, it is theoretically possible for contracts to be completely standardized in
all other terms and vary only in choice of law, but that is not likely to be the general tendency.
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These three states account for the choice of law in approximately 70 percent
of the contracts in our sample, with New York accounting for 47 percent,
Delaware 14 percent, and California 8 percent. The choice of law is other-
wise widely dispersed across many locales and these locales can be excluded
without unduly compromising our measure of concentration. No other
locale accounts for even 4 percent of the choices of law. We use the degree
of concentration among the three leading states to classify contracts as
having high, medium, or low standardization rates.
Figure 1 shows, for 11 contract categories (the category “Other” is
excluded from this analysis because of its heterogeneity), the distribution of
choice of law among New York, Delaware, and California. Bond indentures,
credit commitments, underwriting contracts, pooling service agreements,
and security agreements all have high choice of law concentrations. For
example, nearly all bond indentures and underwriting contracts designate
New York law as the governing law.
Figure 1: Distribution of choice of law by contract type.
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Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, January 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and January 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
Each histogram shows the distribution of contracts by choice of law. Contracts designating
Delaware, New York, or California law are included. All other contracts are coded as designating
an “Other” choice of law and not used in the standardization computation.
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We treat mergers, securities purchase agreements, and asset sale pur-
chase agreements as having medium concentrations. Each has a concentra-
tion (or density) exceeding 0.5 in one state, but these three contract types
are not as concentrated as the highly concentrated group. Settlements,
employment contracts, and licensing agreements have low choice of law
concentrations. None has a density of 0.5.
Figure 2 explores the relation between standardization and the rate of
jury trial waiver clauses. The figure’s left side shows the relation between
contract standardization and the rate of arbitration clause use. As earlier
reported,34 there is a definite trend. The relation between standardization
and jury trial waivers is less monotonic, as shown in Figure 2’s right side. Jury
trial waiver rates are lowest in low standardization contracts and highest in
34Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 16.
Figure 2: Contract standardization, jury waivers, and arbitration clauses.
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contracts with mid-level standardization. Jury trial waiver occurs in 23 of 226
(10.2 percent) of low standardization domestic contracts and in 411 of 2,067
(19.9 percent) of medium or high standardization domestic contracts. The
difference is highly statistically significant (p < 0.001). The second set of bars
on Figure 2’s right side, those labeled “Arbitration clause as jury waiver,”
shows that the standardization-waiver pattern changes if one characterizes
arbitration clauses as jury trial waivers. The strong arbitration clause pattern
shown on the left side of the figure dampens the pattern in non-arbitration-
clause contracts.
If one excludes contracts with arbitration clauses from consideration
(other than those expressly waiving jury trials), thereby treating them as
neither jury trial waivers nor non-jury trial waivers, the pattern in the bars
labeled “Jury waiver clause” reemerges. Then, waiver rates are significantly
different in low standardization contracts compared to medium or high
standardization contracts (14 of 159 (8.8 percent) vs. 413 of 1,870 (22.1
percent; p < 0.001)). Thus, those who want to use the court system, as evi-
denced by a no-arbitration clause, tend to opt for bench trials in more highly
standardized contracts.
3. Contract Choice of Forum
We hypothesized that jury trial waiver rates would vary by choice of forum.
Table 3 reports jury trial waiver rates as a function of choice of forum. It
aggregates all states chosen as a forum in fewer than 20 contracts as “Other.”
Interstate variation exists, with over 80 percent of contracts specifying Illinois
as a choice of forum waiving jury trials and contracts specifying California,
Texas, or Florida as the forum waiving jury trials about one-third of the
time.35 Delaware, Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio are between the
extremes. Assuming that most major contracts in Illinois have a connection
to the Chicago area, the high waiver rate likely reflects a view of Chicago
juries (although note that there were only 37 total contracts specifying an
Illinois forum).
Interstate variation notwithstanding, Table 3’s most revealing feature is
the difference between contracts that do and do not specify a forum. All the
major states specified as a forum have jury trial waiver rates of at least 33
35For purposes of this analysis, we do not distinguish between federal and state courts within a
state. Many contracts provided for the state or federal courts within a state as the designated
forum.
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percent. Contracts that do not specify a forum have a waiver rate of only 6.4
percent. Thus, over 90 percent of lawyers who do not specify a forum do not
include jury trial waiver clauses. They are, in a sense, opting in to the court
system in all its glory with possible jury or bench trials. This dominant
pattern—no forum choice and no jury trial waiver—accounts for 1,607 of
2,816 contracts. A second group of lawyers and parties wants to control the
forum but also wishes to preserve access to a jury trial: they designate a forum
but do not waive juries. Except for those contracts specifying Illinois as a
forum, more than half the contracts that specify a choice of forum do not opt
out of jury trials. This group accounts for 649 contracts. The difference in
jury trial waiver rates between those contracts that specify a forum and those
that do not is highly statistically significant (p < 0.001).
A third group of lawyers and parties wants to specify the forum, and
avoid juries, but preserve access to judges: they designate a forum and waive
jury trials. This group accounts for 450 contracts. A fourth, small group,
consisting of 110 contracts, does not specify a forum but does waive jury
trials. Thus the vast majority that do not specify a forum fully opt into the
Table 3: Jury Trial Waiver Rates and Contract Choice of Forum
Choice of Forum
No Separate Treatment of
Contracts with Arbitration Clauses
Arbitration Clauses Treated
as Jury Trial Waivers
N No Jury
Trial Waiver
N Jury
Trial Waiver
Rate
(%)
N No Jury
Trial Waiver
N Jury
Trial Waiver
Rate
(%)
CA 47 26 35.6 38 35 47.9
DE 67 53 44.2 58 62 51.7
FL 28 16 36.4 28 16 36.4
IL 7 30 81.1 5 32 86.5
MA 14 12 46.2 10 16 61.5
NY 236 223 48.6 220 239 52.1
OH 12 10 45.5 11 11 50.0
TX 32 16 33.3 27 21 43.8
Bankruptcy court 19 4 17.4 17 6 26.1
No forum specified 1607 110 6.4 1435 282 16.4
Other 146 57 28.1 119 84 41.4
Foreign forum 41 3 6.8 34 10 22.7
Total 2,256 560 19.9 2,002 814 28.9
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, January 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and January 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
The first three numerical columns treat contracts with arbitration clauses no differently than
other contracts. The second set of three numerical columns treats arbitration clauses as jury trial
waivers.
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legal system by preserving access to jury trials. A fifth group of contracts opts
out of the court system altogether by including a contractual arbitration
clause. Table 3’s second set of three columns shows that this occurs in about
9 percent of the contracts. One could appropriately reduce the number of
members in the first four groups to reflect those opting out of the system.
Two of the forum choices in Table 3, though infrequent, merit addi-
tional comment. Twenty-three contracts specified bankruptcy courts as the
forum, presumably because one or more of the parties was involved in a
bankruptcy proceeding as debtor or creditor. In 1994, Congress amended
Title 28 to resolve doubt about bankruptcy courts’ authority to conduct jury
trials. If a right to a jury trial applies to a matter that may be heard by a
bankruptcy judge, the judge “may conduct the jury trial if specially desig-
nated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court and with the express
consent of all the parties.”36 The consent requirement does not necessarily
mean that a contract specifying a bankruptcy court forum thereby assures
avoidance of a jury trial. A proper jury demand may result in the withdrawal
of the case from the bankruptcy court and adjudication by a federal district
court.37 It therefore is appropriate to include in the analysis contracts speci-
fying a bankruptcy court forum.
An additional 44 contracts specified a foreign forum. Jury trials in civil
cases outside the United States are uncommon and one might not expect
such contracts to waive jury trial because doing so would be unnecessary.
However, contracts specifying a foreign forum do not conclusively determine
the forum because courts may not respect the choice. Expressly waiving jury
trial would further reduce the risk of a jury trial and the absence of a waiver
therefore can be important. In any event, including these few foreign-forum
contracts does not materially affect the results.
4. Contract Choice of Law
As in the case of choice of forum, jury trial waivers may vary with choice of
law. Because choice of law is concentrated in three states, we report the rates
of jury trial waiver for four choices of law: Delaware, New York, California,
3628. U.S.C. § 157(e).
37E.g., Michaelesco v. Shefts, 303 B.R. 249 (D. Conn. 2004). Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), a district
court may withdraw cases from the bankruptcy court for cause. The presence of a jury demand
can influence the cause determination. In re Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime Networks, 4 F.3d
1095, 1101 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Kenai Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 136 B.R. 59, 61
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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and Other.38 Table 4 shows the rate of jury trial waivers for these four
choices.
Unlike choice of forum, virtually every contract specifies a choice of
law. And, unlike forum variation, little variation exists in jury trial waiver
rates across choices of law. Table 4’s first three numerical columns show that
the jury trial waiver rate varies by about 4 percent, with 23.7 percent of
contracts specifying Delaware law waiving jury trial compared to 19.6 percent
of contracts specifying New York law. The waiver rates do not differ signifi-
cantly across the four groups (p = 0.357). Greater and statistically significant
variation exists if one regards arbitration clauses as jury trial waivers, as
shown in the table’s last three columns. Much of this variation is attributable
to New York’s low rate of arbitration clauses.39
B. Party-Specific Factors
1. International Contracts Compared to Domestic Contracts
Prior research suggests that foreigners may fear domestic U.S. courts and, in
particular, U.S. juries, more than domestic parties do and therefore may fear
38For contracts that designate more than one state’s law (e.g., New York law governs except
where Delaware law applies), we use the first-mentioned state.
39See Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 16.
Table 4: Jury Trial Waiver Rates and Contract Choice of Law
Choice of Law
No Separate Treatment of Contracts
with Arbitration Clauses
Arbitration Clauses Treated
as Jury Trial Waivers
N No Jury
Trial Waiver
N Jury
Trial Waiver
Rate
(%)
N No Jury
Trial Waiver
N Jury
Trial Waiver
Rate
(%)
DE 289 90 23.7 245 134 35.4
NY 1047 255 19.6 1002 300 23.0
CA 175 44 20.1 136 83 37.9
Other 659 165 20.0 546 278 33.7
Total 2,170 554 20.3 1,929 795 29.2
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, January 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and January 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
The first three numerical columns treat contracts with arbitration clauses no differently than
other contracts. The second set of three numerical columns treats arbitration clauses as jury trial
waivers.
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juries more than do domestic parties.40 Table 5 reports the rates at which
domestic and international contracts have jury trial waivers. Columns 1 and
2 include contracts with arbitration clauses without characterizing all arbi-
tration clauses as jury trial waivers. About 20 percent of both domestic and
international contracts waive jury trials. The difference is not statistically
significant.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 characterize arbitration clauses as jury trial
waivers. Treating arbitration clauses as jury waivers therefore affects interna-
tional contracts more than domestic contracts. Column 4 shows that 39
percent of international contracts then contain waivers compared to about
28 percent of domestic contracts. The result is statistically significant at
p < 0.001.
40Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia, supra note 19, at 1120 (quoting statement that Japanese
litigants cannot get a fair trial because of anti-Japanese bias among U.S. jurors). As reported in
previous work, arbitration clauses are significantly more common for international contracts,
although still infrequent in absolute terms. Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 16.
Table 5: Summary of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses by Party Status
No Separate Treatment
of Contracts with
Arbitration Clauses
Arbitration Clauses
Treated as Jury
Trial Waivers
Total
1 2 3 4
No Jury
Trial Waiver
Jury Trial
Waiver
No Jury
Trial Waiver
Jury Trial
Waiver
No non-U.S.
party (N )
2,034 507 1,829 706 2,541/2,535
Percent 80.1 20.0 72.2 27.9 100.0
Non-U.S.
party (N )
219 53 166 106 270
Percent 80.5 19.5 61.0 39.0 100.0
Total (N ) 2,253 560 1,995 812 2,813/2,807
Percent 80.1 19.9 71.1 28.9 100.0
p = 0.936 for Columns 1 and 2; p < 0.001 for Columns 3 and 4.
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, January 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and January 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
Variation in “Total” column is due to missing values. Columns 3 and 4 treat arbitration clauses
as jury trial waivers. Contracts in which either party is a non-U.S. entry are coded as non-U.S.
party contracts. Row percents may exceed 100.0 due to rounding.
Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts 561
2. Place of Business
We code business location at the state level. Designating a single business
locale per contract requires considering the nature of the contract.41 For
some types of contract, such as merger, two places of business are plausible—
the acquiring company’s and the acquired company’s. For such contracts, we
used what one might expect would normally be the dominant place of
business. For example, for merger contracts, we use the acquiring company’s
place of business. Table 6 shows the business locale chosen for 11 types of
contracts. Because of the varied nature of the contract category “Other,” we
exclude such contracts from this analysis.
Table 7 shows the jury waiver pattern by place of business. Places of
business are more diffuse than choices of law so we report results for more
states in the analysis. Like the previous tables, Table 7 reports the rate of
express jury trial waivers and the rate of jury trial waivers if one equates
arbitration clauses with jury trial waivers. The rates of jury trial waiver vary
from zero for contracts associated with Michigan to 44.4 percent for con-
41One could employ models that include two business locales for a contract. E.g., Eisenberg &
Miller, Arbitration, supra note 16 (considering acquired and acquiring companies locales in
study of mergers). However, the instant analysis already accounts for several geographical
dimensions—choice of forum, choice of law, place of dominant contracting party’s business,
incorporation, and attorney locale. The marginal contribution of a second place of business or
incorporation is likely to be small.
Table 6: Place of Business Assigned to Each Contract Type
Contract Type Place of Business Used
Asset sale purchase Buyer’s place of notice location
Bond indentures Issuer’s place of business
Credit commitments Principal lender’s designated office
Employment contracts Employer’s place of business
Licensing Licensor’s place of business
Mergers Acquiring company’s place of business
Pooling and servicing Depositor’s place of business
Securities purchase Issuer’s place of business
Security agreements Registrant’s place of business
Settlements Reporting company’s place of business
Underwriting Issuer’s place of business
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, January 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and January 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
Excludes contracts categorized as “Other.”
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tracts associated with Oregon. This variation persists if one equates arbitra-
tion clauses with jury trial waivers, but both states have relatively few
contracts associated with them.
For the states with many contracts—California, Florida, New York, and
Texas each have more than 100 contracts—waiver rates are relatively stable.
Table 7: Jury Trial Waiver Rates and Place of Business
Place of
Business
No Separate Treatment of
Contracts with Arbitration Clauses
Arbitration Clauses Treated
as Jury Trial Waivers
N No Jury
Trial Waiver
N Jury
Trial Waiver
Rate
(%)
N No Jury
Trial Waiver
N Jury
Trial Waiver
Rate
(%)
AZ 31 1 3.1 24 8 25.0
CA 293 82 21.9 246 129 34.4
CAN 34 5 12.8 27 12 30.8
CO 45 7 13.5 38 14 26.9
CT 36 8 18.2 34 10 22.7
DC 11 1 8.3 10 2 16.7
DE 26 7 21.2 26 7 21.2
FL 85 27 24.1 75 37 33.0
GA 31 11 26.2 28 14 33.3
IL 66 26 28.3 64 28 30.4
LA 19 2 9.5 14 7 33.3
MA 48 26 35.1 45 29 39.2
MD 36 11 23.4 35 12 25.5
MI 20 0 0.0 19 1 5.0
MN 50 10 16.7 47 13 21.7
MO 19 6 24.0 17 8 32.0
NC 40 11 21.6 36 15 29.4
NH 10 2 16.7 9 3 25.0
NJ 63 17 21.3 55 25 31.3
NV 37 2 5.1 36 3 7.7
NY 208 75 26.5 187 96 33.9
OH 29 10 25.6 27 12 30.8
OR 10 8 44.4 8 10 55.6
PA 67 9 11.8 52 24 31.6
TX 169 42 19.9 153 58 27.5
UT 27 4 12.9 22 9 29.0
VA 51 5 8.9 50 6 10.7
WA 38 3 7.3 29 12 29.3
Other 272 63 18.8 232 103 30.7
Total 1,871 481 20.5 1,645 707 30.1
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, January 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and January 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
Excludes contracts categorized as “Other.” Place of business is assigned to a single state as
described in Table 6.
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For these states, the jury trial waiver rates vary from 26.5 percent in New York
to 19.9 percent in Texas. These two extremes do not significantly differ
(p = 0.108). If one equates arbitration clauses with waivers, the waiver rate
ranges from 34.4 percent in California to 27.5 percent in Texas. That differ-
ence is marginally statistically significant (p = 0.097).
3. Place of Incorporation
For some types of contract, such as merger, two places of incorporation are
plausible—the acquiring company’s and the acquired company’s (but often
both are Delaware). Place of incorporation for a contract is assigned using
the same criteria as was used for place of business above. For example, in
merger contracts, the acquiring company’s place of incorporation is used.
Table 8 reports the proportion of contracts with jury trial waiver
clauses. To keep the output manageable and focus on the states with the
most incorporations, we separately report results for the six states with at
least 50 contracts with a contracting party being incorporated in the state.
States with fewer such contracts are included in the residual category,
“Other.”
The table confirms that Delaware dominates in incorporations. Varia-
tion in place of incorporation can therefore only contribute modestly to
explaining the overall pattern of jury trial waivers. However, variation does
Table 8: Jury Trial Waiver Rates and Place of Incorporation
Place of
Incorporation
No Separate Treatment of
Contracts with Arbitration Clauses
Arbitration Clauses Treated
as Jury Trial Waivers
N No Jury
Trial Waiver
N Jury
Trial Waiver
Rate
(%)
N No Jury
Trial Waiver
N Jury
Trial Waiver
Rate
(%)
CA 74 12 14.0 61 25 29.1
DE 916 194 17.5 822 288 25.9
FL 46 12 20.7 38 20 34.5
MD 73 14 16.1 71 16 18.4
NV 129 18 12.2 105 42 28.6
NY 49 25 33.8 47 27 36.5
Other 584 206 26.1 501 289 36.6
Total 1,871 481 20.5 1,645 707 30.1
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, January 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and January 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
Excludes contracts categorized as “Other.” Separately reports only states with at least 50 con-
tracts with the key contracting party being incorporated in the state.
564 Eisenberg and Miller
exist, with waiver rates varying from12.2 percent inNevada to 33.8 percent for
those contracts with companies incorporated in New York. The differences in
both sections of the table are highly statistically significant (p < 0.001).
4. Attorney Place of Business
Information about attorney locale is sketchier than is information about the
other geographic factors. Attorney locale is available only for law firms
mentioned in the Form 8-K with useable addresses. And we could not always
link an attorney mentioned with a principal party to the contract.
Table 9 reports attorney locale and the rate of jury trial waiver clauses.
It separately reports only states with at least 50 attorney locales. Attorney
locale is more dispersed than choice of law. As shown above, Delaware, New
York, and California account for almost 70 percent of the choices of law but
they account for much less than 50 percent of the attorney locales. Delaware
as a locale for attorneys was not extracted from even 50 contracts. Even
considering the greater likelihood of missing attorney locale data, New York
and California are the leading locales but they constitute a small portion of
the contracts. New York can be identified as an attorney locale in 269
contracts and California can be so identified in 182 contracts. The large
“Other” locale category precludes determining whether attorney locale is
more concentrated than business locale.
Table 9: Jury Trial Waiver Rates and Attorney Locale
Attorney
Locale
No Separate Treatment of
Contracts with Arbitration Clauses
Arbitration Clauses Treated
as Jury Trial Waivers
N No Jury
Trial Waiver
N Jury
Trial Waiver
Rate
(%)
N No Jury
Trial Waiver
N Jury
Trial Waiver
Rate
(%)
CA 119 63 34.6 98 84 46.2
IL 34 17 33.3 30 21 41.2
MA 33 22 40.0 25 30 54.5
NY 197 72 26.8 180 89 33.1
PA 43 7 14.0 36 14 28.0
TX 66 24 26.7 59 31 34.4
Other 1379 276 16.7 1217 438 26.5
Total 1,871 481 20.5 1,645 707 30.1
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, January 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and January 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
Excludes contracts categorized as “Other.” Separately reports only states with at least 50 con-
tracts indicating the state is an attorney’s locale.
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California’s 34.6 percent of contracts with jury trial waivers is higher
than New York’s rate of 26.8 percent, but the difference is only marginally
statistically significant (p = 0.076). Table 9’s last three columns shows that
the difference grows (p = 0.006) if one regards arbitration clauses as jury trial
waivers due to California contracts’ greater use of arbitration clauses. The
insignificant results for New York attorneys are intriguing given our earlier
finding that New York attorneys were significantly more likely than other
attorneys to include choice of forum provisions in merger contracts,42 thus
suggesting that they pay close attention to ex ante dispute resolution con-
siderations. However, such attention does not extend to waiving jury trials at
a significantly above-average rate.43
5. Industry Groups
We hypothesized that jury trial waiver may vary by industry. A reporting
company’s SEC filing includes its Standard Industry Classification (SIC),
which consists of a four-digit SIC code.44 The SIC system used in SEC filings
yields many industry categories that contain too few firms to allow for rea-
sonable statistical analysis. We therefore regroup the SIC categories into 17
reasonably sized classifications.45
Table 10 reports the rate of jury trial waiver clauses by these classifica-
tions. Waiver clause use varies by industry. The table as a whole yields
42Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 16.
43Note also the prominence of merger contracts and attorney locale in the branch of Figure 5’s
classification tree when a contract does not specify a forum. Merger contracts are the highest
node under the no-forum-specified node and attorney locale is the highest node under merger
contracts.
Table 9 also suggests that Illinois attorneys are not associated with an unusually high rate of
jury trial waivers. Yet Table 3 suggests that Illinois as a choice of forum is associated with a high
waiver rate. The high waiver rate associated with Illinois as a choice of forum may result from
waivers by non-Illinois attorneys who designate Illinois as a forum. However, this result is
tentative because of the many contracts without attorney locale information.
44See 〈http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm〉.
45The 28 industry groups used in U.S. General Accounting Office, Public Accounting Firms:
Mandated Study on Consolidation and Competition, GAO-3-864, at 111 (July 2003), were
reduced to the 17 industry groups used in Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was
Arthur Andersen Different?: An Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firms’ Audits of
Large Clients, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 263 (2004).
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statistically significant interindustry differences (p < 0.001). The “finance,
insurance, real estate” grouping is the largest, accounting for over one-
quarter of the contracts, and has a low rate (11.3 percent) of jury trial waiver
clauses. The “transportation and utilities” industry has the same low rate.
The highest rate of jury trial waiver clauses, 33.1 percent, is in the “electrical
and electronic equipment” grouping. Comparing Table 10 to Table 2 indi-
cates that the range of jury trial waiver rates is much smaller across industry
(11.3 to 33.1 percent) than it is across contract type (1.9 to 64.5 percent).
Table 10: Jury Trial Waiver Rates and Industry
Major Industry Groups
No Separate Treatment of
Contracts with Arbitration Clauses
Arbitration Clauses Treated
as Jury Trial Waivers
N No Jury
Trial Waiver
N Jury
Trial Waiver
Rate
(%)
N No Jury
Trial Waiver
N Jury
Trial Waiver
Rate
(%)
Mineral industries 83 18 17.8 72 29 28.7
Construction industries 19 7 26.9 16 10 38.5
Manufacturing 119 41 25.6 105 55 34.4
Transportation &
utilities
94 12 11.3 91 15 14.2
Communications 82 25 23.4 76 31 29.0
Wholesale trade 57 28 32.9 50 35 41.2
Retail trade 69 28 28.9 59 38 39.2
Finance, insurance,
real estate
673 86 11.3 647 112 14.8
Services 405 149 26.9 333 221 39.9
Instruments & related
products
50 18 26.5 43 25 36.8
Food & kindred
products, agriculture,
forest, fishing
24 10 29.4 23 11 32.4
Paper & allied products 18 3 14.3 16 5 23.8
Chemicals & allied
products
123 33 21.2 102 54 34.6
Industrial machinery &
equip.
78 23 22.8 58 43 42.6
Electrical & electronic
equip.
87 43 33.1 70 60 46.2
Transportation equip. 23 5 17.9 19 9 32.1
No SIC listed or SIC
missing
252 31 11.0 222 61 21.6
Total 2,256 560 19.9 2,002 814 28.9
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, January 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and January 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger
contracts.
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Industry practice thus appears to be less of a driving force on trial jury waiver
rates than is the kind of contract.
C. Jury-Trial-Related Factors External to the Parties or the Contract
Jury-related factors external to the contracts and parties should influence
jury trial waiver rates. The contract types and the parties do not change their
inherent characteristics as the result of jury-related considerations. In con-
trast, jury-related factors external to the parties and contracts may directly
influence parties considering jury trial waivers. Parties who perceive juries to
be unfair should waive jury trials regardless of party or contract characteris-
tics. The parties can retain their choice of law, choice of forum, and other
salient contract terms without subjecting themselves to a possibly unfair
adjudicator. Similarly, parties who believe jury trials to be relatively costly and
inefficient can avoid juries without altering other contract characteristics.
1. Perceived Fairness of States’ Juries
One measure of whether perceptions of juries are associated with the rate of
jury trial waivers is whether states perceived to have the least fair juries have
the highest rates of jury trial waiver clauses. Figure 3 shows the relation
between a state’s rate of jury trial waiver clauses and large corporations’, as
surveyed by the Chamber of Commerce,46 perceptions of states’ jury fair-
ness.47 We associate states with contracts based on the contractual term that
most directly addresses the potential jury pool, the choice of forum.
If a positive association exists between jury fairness perceptions and
jury trial waiver rates, the figure’s data points should flow from lower left to
upper right. The lower left of the figure, near the origin, corresponds with
high, favorable rankings in perceived jury fairness and low jury waiver rates.
The upper right corresponds with low rankings in perceived jury fairness and
high-ranking jury trial waiver clause rates. The expected relation is observed.
46E.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 26. The Chamber and other business groups use
the Chamber’s ranking studies to try to influence courts to restrict causes of action and
constrain legal actions against the business community. E.g., Brief of Chamber of Commerce of
the United States, 2004 WL 2125702, Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2005);
Amicus Curiae Brief of Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce, 2002WL 32699975, Wischer v. Mitsubishi Heavy
Inds. Am., Inc., 673 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. App. 2002). We use the 2002 Chamber Report because it
corresponds to the year of our contracts.
47Chamber of Commerce, supra note 26, at 28 (tbl. 15 Juries’ Fairness).
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Figure 3 shows a reasonably strong association between perceived jury fair-
ness and jury trial waivers. A measure of the linear correlation, as repre-
sented by the straight line in the figure, is statistically significant (r
(correlation) = 0.42; p = 0.014).48 Excluding contracts with arbitration
clauses from the sample or counting them as jury trial waivers does not
materially change the results.
48This result is based on counting each state as an equal observation and using rankings. Using
Kenall’s tau yields p = 0.022. Weighting by the number of contracts for each state reduces size
and significance of the effect (r (correlation) = 0.14; p (significance) = 0.427). However, limit-
ing the sample to states with at least five contracts yields a result similar to the unweighted
correlation (r = 0.36; p = 0.090). Contract-level models that account for both the number of
observations and other factors are discussed in Section V.
Figure 3: Jury waiver clause rank and jury fairness rank.
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Sources: U.S. Chamber of Commerce State Liability Systems Ranking Study, Final Report,
January 11, 2002 (Study No. 14966); SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database,
January 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other than mergers and January 2002 to July
31, 2002 for merger contracts. Low numerical rankings in the Chamber’s system correspond to
more fairly ranked jury trial systems. We include states specified as a forum in at least two
contracts. The Chamber ranking for the remaining states is not included and the 33 included
states were reranked from 1 to 33. Ties in rank are not broken.
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2. Difference in Adjudication Time for Judge and Jury Trials
The second external influence on jury trial waivers considered is the relative
length of the jury trial and bench trial queues in a state. We assess the time
on the docket for jury and bench trials using trial data from the Civil Justice
Survey of State Courts, a project of the National Center for State Courts and the
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). The data come directly from state court
clerks’ offices and include information on judge and jury trials for all tort,
contract, and property trials completed in 2001 in a random sample of 46 of
the 75 most populous counties in the United States.49
Data limitations allow only partially exploring the waiver-trial queue
relation. The BJS sample includes only 16 of the states with a reasonable
number of contracts. The data are limited to the counties in the BJS sample
and are not a representative statewide sample. Nevertheless, the most popu-
lous counties, those used in the BJS study, likely are the dominant choices of
forum, places of business, and the like. So these counties are more likely to
be the locales for litigation than are smaller counties.
Studying the relation between differences in jury and bench trial
queues and jury trial waiver rates requires quantifying each state’s difference
in time to adjudication for jury and bench trials. Comparing this difference
across states requires accounting for the different mixes of case types in the
states. If, for example, products liability cases are on the docket longer than
promissory note trials,50 assessing jury-bench differences across states should
account for the different proportions of each state’s trial docket that consists
of products liability and promissory note cases. We therefore ran a regression
model of time on the docket (log) and extracted from it a measure of the
49The 75 counties from which the sample was drawn include approximately 33 percent of
the 1990 U.S. population; the actual 46 counties contributing data account for approximately
20 percent of the population. For a summary of the data and methodology, see BJS Bulletin,
supra note 12. The data include information on trial length in large counties in 16
states: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Washington.
50Available data indicate that time on the docket differs across case categories. BJS Bulletin,
supra note 12, at 8 (products liability tried cases last 35.1 months compared to an overall tort
tried case period of 25.6 months; contracts cases take 21.5 months).
570 Eisenberg and Miller
difference between jury and bench trial queues in each locale, after account-
ing for the case mix.51
Figure 4 shows the jury-bench queue difference measure, along the
x-axis, and the jury trial waiver rate, measured along the y-axis. The figure
uses only contracts containing a choice of forum. Choosing a forum effec-
tively identifies a jury pool and a locale in which to compare the time of jury
51For the case categories used, see BJS Bulletin, supra note 12. The measure of difference is the
regression coefficient on an interaction term consisting of a dummy variable for each state times
a dummy variable for jury trials. The regression model included dummy variables for each of the
many case categories in the BJS data. The interaction term coefficients are the x-axis values in
Figure 4.
Figure 4: Jury trial waiver rate and jury-bench time to adjudication
difference.
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Sources: BJS data on trial outcomes in 46 large counties, 2001; SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS
EDGAR PLUS database, January 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other than mergers
and January 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts. The x-axis is a measure, based on
regression analysis of the BJS data, of the difference in time to adjudiction between jury and
bench trials in a state. The lines are the lowess-smoothed best-fitting values. The y-axis is based
on the trial waiver clause data used in this study.
Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts 571
and bench adjudication.52 The figure’s left side treats arbitration clauses as
jury trial waivers. The right side does not treat arbitration clauses separately.
Neither side shows the expected increasing relation. The lines in the
figure are the lowess-smoothed best-fitting lines.53 No monotonic relation
emerges between our measure of jury-bench trial time difference and the
rate of jury trial waivers. If anything, most states show an inverse association
between jury trial waiver rates and the difference in jury and bench trial time
of adjudication. However, this inverse relation does not hold for Illinois.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the figure is the large difference
between the jury and bench trial times to disposition in Illinois. Chicago
litigants54 must wait substantially longer, about 16 months, for jury-tried cases
to terminate than for judge-tried cases. That difference is about 13 months
if one adjusts for the different mix of cases routed to juries and judges.
Assessment of the two external influences on jury trial waivers suggests
that perceived jury fairness may help explain the waiver-clause pattern in
regression models explored below, but that the trial-queue information will
not. We therefore use only the fairness factor in the models.
V. Regression Models
Preliminary regression models, not reported here, employed as explanatory
variables the most frequently appearing places of business, places of incor-
poration, and choice of law. These variables were consistently statistically
insignificant in models that included what appear to be the variables most
strongly associated with jury trial waivers. We therefore focus instead on
choice of forum, domestic versus international party status, perceived jury
fairness, contract type, and industry classification.
52One could also reasonably explore the relation between other contract-specific geographic
features (place of business, place of incorporation, attorney locale, choice of law) and the rate
of jury trial waivers. We expected the link between waiver and geography to be strongest when
a forum has been designated.
53Lowess smoothing is locally weighted regression of the y-variable on the x-variable. Lowess is
a desirable smoother because it tends to follow the flow in the data rather than allow remote
extreme points to affect a local value. See W.S. Cleveland, The Elements of Graphing Data
(1994).
54Cook County (Chicago) is the only Illinois county in the BJS data.
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The dependent variable in all regression models is a dichotomous
variable equal to 1 if a contract contains a jury trial waiver and equal to 0
otherwise. Additional preliminary logistic regression models, also not
reported, yielded results largely consistent with Section IV’s results except
that, inconsistently with Table 3, there was no significant association between
a contract specifying a forum and jury trial being waived. Table 3 suggests
that the presence of a litigation forum clause is strongly associated with the
presence of a jury trial waiver clause. Only 6.4 percent of the contracts not
specifying a choice of forum contain a jury trial waiver clause compared to
40.9 percent of the contracts that do specify a choice of forum. It thus is likely
that, for most contracts, a decision is made about whether to specify a forum,
and that decision is made simultaneously with, or triggers a related decision
about, whether to avoid juries in that forum. A decision not to specify a
forum is usually tantamount to not waiving jury trials.
Further inquiry into the relation between forum specification and jury
trial waiver was therefore appropriate using methods less subject to the
limitations of logistic regression analysis. Figure 5 is a classification and
regression tree (CART) of whether jury trial was waived as it relates to the
variables of interest. CART analysis helps explore how decisions branch at
what are believed to be relevant nodes (the variables).55 Each node in a
decision tree is split into two groups, and the data are partitioned into those
groups to process the data farther down the tree. This binary partitioning
process can be repeated, with “child” nodes generating their own subnodes.
As seen in Figure 5, each node can be the parent of two nodes and the
progenitor of subsequent nodes. CART has the advantage over logistic
regression of being nonparametric and therefore not depending on under-
lying assumptions about the distribution of the explanatory variables.
Figure 5 confirms Table 3’s evidence of a strong association between a
forum being specified and the presence of a jury trial waiver clause. Speci-
fying a forum is the highest node in the classification tree, suggesting that
influences on the decision to waive a trial are subordinate to the forum
specification decision. This further supports the common-sense notion that
deciding whether to waive a jury trial is not independent of deciding whether
to specify a forum. Common factors may affect both decisions but it is
implausible that whether to specify a forum is unrelated to whether to waive
jury trials.
55Leo Breiman, Jerome Friedman, Charles J. Stone & R.A. Olshen, Classification and Regression
Trees (1984).
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The forum-specification decision, like the waiver-clause decision, is
itself likely associated with contract type. For example, 69.2 percent of 211
credit commitment contracts with information about forum specify a forum.
That exceeds in rate and number jury trial waivers in credit commitment
contracts shown in Table 2. Virtually every security agreement that specifies
a forum also waives jury trial. The Appendix shows that, for every contract
type other than settlement, a higher fraction of contracts that specify a forum
include jury trial waivers than the fraction of contracts that do not specify a
forum. Except for a small minority of contracts (the 6.4 percent Table 3
shows to waive jury trial without specifying a forum), the jury trial waivers are
from the pool of contracts that designate a forum. The Appendix also shows
strong variation in the forum-specification/jury-trial-waiver relation across
contract types.
The powerful contract-type effects likely influence the decision to des-
ignate a forum as well as the decision to waive a jury trial, as the credit
commitment and security agreement numbers suggest. The greater fre-
quency of forum selection than jury trial waiver indicates that waiver clauses
are largely conditional on specifying a forum. Thus, the no forum variable
in simple logistic regression models likely is not exogenous. It depends on
other explanatory variables, at least the contract types. A model of jury trial
waiver therefore should account for whether a contract designates a litiga-
tion forum. We first model, using probit regression, the decision to include
a forum provision in a contract.56 The probabilities of a forum selection
clause being present, obtained in this preliminary model, are used to gen-
erate a variable, employed in probit models of whether a contract includes a
jury trial waiver clause, that corrects for the endogeneity of whether a forum
is specified.57
Table 11 reports the corrected trial waiver probit models. The variable
representing whether a forum was specified, no forum, is an explanatory
56The presence of a forum selection clause was modeled as a function of contract-type dummy
variables, a non-U.S. party dummy variable, and attorney locale dummy variables. We include
attorney locale variables discussed with respect to Table 9 because previous work showed that
New York attorneys specified a forummore frequently than other attorneys in merger contracts.
Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 16. In the forum equations, many contract types are
strongly and significantly associated with whether a forum is specified. Most of the forum
equations’ attorney locale dummy variables are statistically significant from the reference cat-
egory, “other or unknown attorney locale.”
57We thank Professor Martin Wells for showing us how to do this correction.
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Table 11: Probit Models of Jury Trial Waiver: Dependent Variable = Jury
Trial Waiver Present
1
No Separate
Arbitration Clause
Treatment
2
Arbitration
Clauses Treated
as Waivers
3
No Separate
Arbitration Clause
Treatment
Non-U.S. party -0.132
(1.11)
0.217*
(2.09)
-0.182+
(1.67)
No forum -2.939**
(5.94)
-2.060**
(4.32)
-1.514*
(2.55)
DE forum 1.211**
(2.82)
1.059*
(2.45)
1.018*
(2.50)
FL forum 0.411
(1.38)
0.074
(0.25)
0.278
(1.03)
IL forum 1.228**
(4.10)
1.200**
(3.77)
1.239**
(4.25)
MA forum -0.320
(0.92)
0.049
(0.14)
0.260
(0.85)
NY forum 0.814**
(3.63)
0.733**
(3.22)
0.763**
(3.62)
OH forum 1.011**
(2.60)
0.955*
(2.47)
0.692+
(1.91)
TX forum -0.152
(0.54)
0.048
(0.18)
-0.349
(1.33)
Other forum 0.453+
(1.66)
0.502+
(1.82)
0.223
(0.86)
CA forum (reference category)
High standardization 0.326*
(2.04)
-0.608**
(5.36)
Medium standardization 0.027
(0.18)
-0.417**
(3.82)
Low standardization (reference category)
Chamber fairness rank 0.034**
(2.68)
0.030*
(2.41)
0.027*
(2.24)
Asset sale purchase -0.245+
(1.75)
Bond indentures -0.613*
(2.04)
Credit commitments 0.621**
(3.96)
Employment contracts -0.577*
(2.35)
Licensing -0.171
(0.48)
Pooling service -0.247
(0.94)
Securities purchase -0.177
(1.64)
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variable, as suggested by Table 3 and Figure 5. Models 1 and 3 provide for no
special treatment of contracts with arbitration clauses. Model 2 treats the
presence of an arbitration clause as a waiver of jury trial.58 Model 3 differs
from Model 1 in its treatment of contract types. Model 1 uses our contract
standardization measures as explanatory variables. Model 3 uses dummy
variables for the contract types instead. All models include the non-U.S.
party variable, the state forum dummy variables, and the Chamber of
Commerce jury-fairness ranking as explanatory variables in the waiver
58Other models, not reported here, exclude from the sample contracts with arbitration clauses.
These models explore whether the 80 percent of contracts that do not have arbitration clauses
waive jury trials. They do not yield results materially different from those reported here.
Table 11: Continued
1
No Separate
Arbitration Clause
Treatment
2
Arbitration
Clauses Treated
as Waivers
3
No Separate
Arbitration Clause
Treatment
Security agreements 0.775**
(3.19)
Settlements -0.282
(1.27)
Underwriting -0.684**
(3.90)
Other contract -0.011
(0.09)
Mergers (reference category)
Pseudo R 2 0.334 0.227 0.325
N 2,274 2,274 2,723
Note: Constants included in models but not reported; contracts of type “Other” omitted from
Models 1 and 2. Robust z statistics in parentheses; +significant at 10%; *at 5%, **at 1%.
Probability weights account for the one month of additional sampling of merger contracts and
models include, but do not report, dummy variables for industry groups. Models adjust for
endogeneity of no forum by using preliminary probit regressions of no forum as a function of
contract type, non-U.S. party, and attorney locale, and adjusting in the waiver equations for the
probability of a forum selection clause being present.
Sources: U.S. Chamber of Commerce State Liability Systems Ranking Study, Final Report,
January 11, 2002 (Study No. 14966); SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database,
January 2002 to June 30, 2002 for contracts other than mergers, January 2002 to July 31, 2002
for mergers.
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equation. The models include, but we do not separately report, dummy
variables for the major industry groups summarized in Table 10.59
As suggested by Table 3 and Figure 5, the no forum variable is statis-
tically significant in explaining the absence of a jury trial waiver. Table 11
also shows substantial choice of forum effects. In Models 1 and 3, Delaware,
Illinois, New York, and Ohio are significantly or nearly significantly more
likely to contain jury waiver clauses than the reference state, California.
These results are consistent with Table 3’s simple results. The size of the
Illinois effect is striking. For example, a marginal effects estimate indicates
that it increases the probability of a jury trial waiver by approximately
0.40.60 The relatively low rate of California jury trial waivers may be due to
California’s judicial limitation on the enforceability of jury waivers.61 That
limitation was established after the period of our study but may have been
anticipated by sophisticated parties.
The Chamber of Commerce’s ranking of jury fairness is significantly
associated with jury trial waivers. As the Chamber ranks a forum less fair,
contracts that designate that forum tend to waive jury trials, confirming
Figure 3’s pattern. Industry effects, not separately reported, as a whole are
statistically significant. In Model 1, for example, a test of the hypothesis that
the industry dummy variables are jointly 0 yields a p value of less than 0.001.
Construction companies are the most likely to have jury trial waivers. Paper
and allied products companies are the least likely.
Model 1 also includes our measures of contract standardization, as
represented by the dummy variables high standardization and medium
standardization, with low standardization as the reference category.
Both standardization variables are associated with increased likelihood of a
jury trial waiver clause and the high standardization variable is statistically
significant. In Model 3, several of the contract-type dummy variables are
statistically significant and the results are largely consistent with Table 2’s
description of the relation between contract types and jury trial waiver.
59The variable constructed to correct for endogeneity, not reported, is statistically significant
(p < 0.01) in the three models.
60Figure 5 suggests that the Illinois effect is felt most prominently, highest up in the classification
tree, in securities purchase contracts.
61See supra note 1.
578 Eisenberg and Miller
Some results change in size and/or direction in Model 2, which treats
arbitration clauses as the equivalent of jury trial waivers. The sign on the
high standardization variable changes in Model 2. This is consistent with
Figure 2’s showing that the relation between contract standardization and
arbitration clause rates differs from the relation between standardization
and jury trial waiver rates. Model 2’s coefficient for non-U.S. party shows
that international contracts are significantly more likely than domestic con-
tracts to avoid jury trials by either arbitration clauses or jury trial waiver
clauses. The opposite sign on this variable in Models 1 and 3 shows that this
effect is attributable to the treatment of contracts with arbitration clauses.
When they are not treated as jury trial waivers, international contracts are
mildly less likely than domestic contracts to contain jury waivers.
VI. Discussion of Results
Sections IV and V contain two separable classes of results. The first and
principal result is that sophisticated parties tended to preserve access to jury
trials when they could agree to avoid the risks of such trials. Second are a set
of results suggesting the factors that influence the decision to include con-
tract clauses waiving jury trials. These results provide a deeper understand-
ing of the minority of contracts in which parties shun juries.
A. Contracting Parties’ Preservation of Access to Jury Trials
A rich academic literature explores the possible advantages and disadvan-
tages of juries as finders of fact. One set of studies raises questions about the
efficiency or fairness of the jury. For example, studies suggest that juries may
give undue weight to eyewitness testimony,62 statements against interest,63
62See, e.g., John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate
the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 Law & Hum. Behav. 19 (1983) (mock jurors
predicted that eyewitness testimony was 71 percent accurate when actual accuracy rate was only
13 percent); Gary L. Walls et al., Accuracy, Confidence and Jury Perceptions in Eyewitness
Identification, 64 J. Applied Psychology 440 (1979). Juries may be especially swayed if the expert
couches his or her testimony in highly technical terms. See Irwin A. Horowitz, Kenneth S.
Bordens, Elizabeth Victor, Martin J. Bourgeois & Lynne Forster Lee, The Effects of Complexity
on Jurors’ Verdicts and Construction of Evidence, 86 J. Applied Psychol. 641, 649 (2001).
63Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 Am. Psychologist 221 (1997).
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and expert opinions,64 and may unduly discount forensic evidence such as
DNA matches.65 Juries may misunderstand circumstantial evidence66 or fail
to reach a correct result in circumstantial cases even when they understand
the probative value of the evidence.67 Jurors may be influenced by the
personality of the lawyers, the physical appearance of the parties,68 or the size
of the requested damages award,69 and may decide on the basis of inappro-
priate factors such as dislike for business litigants70 or moral judgments about
a party’s conduct.71 Jurors may be subject to cognitive shortcomings such as
64Allan Raitz, Edith Greene, Jane Goodman & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Determining Damages: The
Influence of Expert Testimony on Jurors’ Decision Making, 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 385, 393
(1990).
65Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence: An Empirical
Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Small Random-Match
Probability, 34 J. Legal Stud. 395 (2005).
66See, e.g., William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence
in Criminal Trials, 11 Law & Hum. Behav. 167 (1987) (66 percent of mock jurors significantly
underestimated the probative value of blood evidence).
67See, e.g., Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability
Enough? 62 Personality & Soc. Psychol. 739 (1992).
68See, e.g., Catherine T. Harris, Ralph Peeples & Thomas B. Metzloff, Placing “Standard of Care”
in Context: The Impact of Witness Potential and Attorney Reputation in Medical Malpractice
Litigation, 3 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 467 (2006) (when liability was rated as uncertain or
unlikely, strategic variables such as perceived witness potential and the reputation of the
plaintiff’s counsel were significant predictors of case outcome); Robert J. MacCoun, The Emer-
gence of Extralegal Bias During Jury Deliberation, 17 Crim. Just. & Behav. 303, 311 (1990)
(mock juries were more likely to acquit when the defendant was physically attractive).
69Cass Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide (2002); Gretchen B. Chapman &
Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask for, the More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury
Verdicts, 10 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 519, 538 (1996).
70Sunstein et al., supra note 69.
71Edith Greene, Michael Johns & Alison Smith, The Effects of Defendant Conduct on Jury
Damage Awards, 86 J. Applied Psychol. 228 (2001).
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hindsight bias,72 imperfect attention spans,73 limited memories, confusion as
to the identities of multiple plaintiffs,74 and inability to understand or imple-
ment the trial court’s instructions on the law.75 In consequence, they may
reach different results in similar cases and, occasionally, award damages that
are hard to justify based on the facts of a case.76
Other studies evince a more optimistic assessment of the value and
accuracy of jury decisions. For example, despite the widespread belief that
jury awards of punitive damages are arbitrary and excessive, numerous
studies find that jury awards of punitive damages are not increasing in
frequency or size and are not arbitrary.77 Treatment of corporations may also
be more nuanced than critics suggest: juries do not always rule against
“deep-pocket” defendants, even when the beneficiary of such a ruling would
be a sympathetic individual plaintiff.78 Moreover, the fact that juries may be
72Sunstein et al., supra note 69; Susan J. Lebine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence
and the Hindsight Bias, 20 Law & Hum. Behav. 501 (1996) (study participants were more likely
to find the therapist negligent when informed that the patient had in fact become violent).
73Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps Between Attitudes and Verdicts, in Inside the Juror: The
Psychology of Juror Decision Making 42–43 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
74Lynne Forster Lee, Irwin A. Horowitz & Martin J. Bourgeois, Juror Competence in Civil Trials:
Effects of Preinstruction and Evidence Technicality, 78 J. Applied Psychol. 14, 19 (1993).
75Sunstein et al., supra note 69; Judith L. Ritter, Your Lips Are Moving . . . But the Words Aren’t
Clear: Dissecting the Presumption that Jurors Understand Instructions, 69 Mo. L. Rev. 163, 164
(2004).
76Sunstein et al., supra note 69.
77E.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Michael Heise, Neil LaFountain, G.
Thomas Munsterman, Brian Ostrom & Martin T. Wells, Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages:
Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3
J. Empirical Legal Stud. 263, 266 n.8 (2006) (collecting authorities); Theodore Eisenberg &
Martin T. Wells, The Significant Association Between Punitive and Compensatory Damages in
Blockbuster Cases: A Methodological Primer, 3 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 169 (2006).
78See Valerie P. Hans, Business on Trial: The Civil Jury and Corporate Responsibility (2000);
Robert J. MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination
of the “Deep-Pockets” Hypothesis, 30 Law & Soc’y Rev. 121, 143 (1996) (“existing evidence
argues against a deep-pocket interpretation of jury verdict patterns”); Valerie P. Hans, The
Jury’s Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 Law & Contemp. Probs. 177, 202
(1989) (“juries show remarkable restraint in judging corporate culpability”); Valerie P. Hans,
The Contested Role of the Civil Jury in Civil Litigation, 79 Judicature 242, 248 (1996) (“deep
pockets explanation . . . does not fare well in this set of studies”).
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imperfect is not, in itself, a sufficient reason for rejecting them as finders of
fact, since judges are also subject to cognitive biases79 and to the influence of
emotion or prejudice.80 Indeed, because there is only one judge, but mul-
tiple jurors, the possibility of inaccurate results may in some respects be
greater in a bench trial because the group-decision process of a civil jury
tends to control for outliers.81 Thus, to the degree that juries and judges
differ, there is no a priori reason to conclude that judges are the more
accurate.82
Our study sheds light on this debate, at least as it pertains to the value
of civil juries in cases involving large commercial contracts. As noted else-
where,83 the contracts in our sample constitute or are connected with events
that are material to the financial conditions of publicly traded corporations.
It is reasonable to assume that they receive care and attention during nego-
tiation and drafting from the reporting firm’s employees or from outside
counsel (or both). Because the contracts are negotiated before disputes
arise, moreover, we can infer that in most cases the contracting parties did
not anticipate the precise nature of any dispute that might arise, and there-
fore would not know whether a particular term would help or hurt them in
the event of a conflict. Thus if jury trials create greater uncertainty or
generate higher costs than other mechanisms for resolving disputes, well-
79Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 80 Cornell L.
Rev. 777, 802–03 (2001) (finding that judges are subject to hindsight bias).
80See David S. Abrams, Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Judges Vary in Their
Treatment of Race? (manuscript, Apr. 2006) (judges may display racial bias in criminal
sentencing).
81On the other hand, in the case of the jury, there is the possibility that group pressures could
negatively affect the reliability of decisions. See M. Neil Browne, Carrie Williamson & Garrett
Coyle, The Shared Assumptions of the Jury System and the Market System, 50 St. Louis Univ. L.J.
425, 466 (2006).
82Evidence suggests that systematic differences exist between judges and juries as factfinders,
even though much agreement also exists. For example, judges are more likely to convict in
criminal cases. Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L.
Waters, G. Thomas Munsterman, Stewart J. Schwab & Martin T. Wells, Judge-Jury Agreement in
Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven & Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. Empirical Legal
Stud. 171 (2005). However, studies find no systematic differences between judges and juries in
the relation between punitive and compensatory damages. E.g., Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges,
and Punitive Damages, supra note 77.
83Eisenberg & Miller, Merger, supra note 21; Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 16.
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informed and sophisticated parties may be expected to forego them as a
matter of course. On the other hand, if jury trials are not perceived to be
inferior to other dispute-resolution mechanisms, then such parties will not
uniformly opt out. In the absence of significant transactions costs or third-
party effects, moreover, parties bargaining for mutual advantage will tend to
agree to provisions that maximize the social surplus.84 Such bargaining
includes provisions regarding the resolution of disputes that might arise
under the contract.85 Thus the observed behavior of the contracting
parties—such as the data presented in this study—provides information
about the social benefits as well as the private value of jury trials.
The evidentiary value of our study is contingent on several factors. First,
the alignment between the outcome of private bargaining and social surplus
will potentially be undermined if the outcome of that process affects the
interests of third parties not present at the bargaining table. However, exter-
nalities would appear to be relatively modest in the case of the large com-
mercial contracts under review here, and even when externalities are
present, they have no obvious bearing on the issue of jury trial waiver.86
Second, the observed contract terms may not align with social welfare
if agency costs are significant—if the attorneys who negotiate and draft the
contracts serve their own interests at the expense of their clients. It is possible
to conjecture some agency costs. For example, if jury trials are more expen-
sive and risky than bench trials, it may be in lawyers’ self-interest to preserve
them as a dispute-resolution possibility in order to earn larger fees in the
event the contract becomes disputed and the drafting attorney is chosen to
litigate the matter. Although this possibility cannot be ruled out, it seems
84Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 Yale
L.J. 239 (1984). This is true even if a jury trial would predictably benefit one of the contracting
parties at the expense of the other. See, e.g., David S. Steuer, A Litigator’s Perspective on the
Drafting of Commercial Contracts (PLI Dec. 2004–Jan. 2005). Even if it is known ex ante that
a jury trial would benefit one party at the expense of the other, if overall it is more efficient than
a bench trial, both parties can make themselves better off by agreeing not to waive the jury, with
the disadvantaged party receiving a more than compensatory setoff in some other term of the
contract.
85See, e.g., Keith Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic
Analysis, 8 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 209 (2000); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An
Economic Analysis, 24 J. Legal Stud. 1, 5 (1995).
86In general, an agreement to waive a jury trial would not bind third parties not party to or in
privity with a party to the contract.
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strained to suggest that it often plays a decisive role in attorney decisions,
especially given that the contracting entities in our sample are sophisticated
parties that usually have access to the advice of capable in-house counsel.
Other than such speculative effects, it is hard to identify a strong self-interest
that would induce an attorney to seek or eschew an agreement on jury trials
that would harm the interests of his or her client.
Third, our sample may not provide reliable evidence of efficient
dispute-resolution terms if the transactions costs of the bargaining itself
prevent the parties from achieving an optimal substantive result. One
hypothesis could be that the issue of jury trial waivers is one of de minimis
importance, so that lawyers negotiating contracts do not actively consider or
decide whether to include a waiver or not.87 We cannot rule out the possi-
bility that jury trial waivers are mere matters of “boilerplate” that receive no
scrutiny or consideration by the contracting parties, but we consider this to
be unlikely for contracts in our sample. These large commercial contracts
constitute all or part of transactions deemed to be material to the affairs of
SEC-reporting companies. The contract dispute-resolution provisions should
be important enough to receive attention from the attorneys. Jury trial
waivers are included in a significant number of contracts that appear to be
individually negotiated (e.g., settlement of disputes). Even when the con-
tract in question is highly standardized (e.g., pooling and servicing agree-
ments), the model on which the contract is based likely has been thoroughly
considered by sophisticated business lawyers. Jury trial waivers do, in fact,
become important issues in litigation, and have generated many judicial
decisions.88 Accordingly, the presence or absence of a jury trial waiver in a
sophisticated commercial contract will often reflect considered judgments
about what arrangement best serves the joint interests of the contacting
parties.
87In such cases, if no mention is made in the contract, a jury trial would ordinary be available in
lawsuits for contract damages. Or if the attorney utilizes a model or form that contains a jury trial
waiver, a jury may be foregone, although without active consideration by the parties. Jury trial
waivers are contained in some model contracts. See, e.g., Ted A. Donner, Attorney’s Practice
Guide to Negotiations § 14:29. Sample agreements—Business agreement (2006) (“The parties
agree that any dispute hereunder shall be resolved by bench trial and waive the right to any trial
by jury hereunder.”); 2 Model Agreements for Corporate Counsel § 16:13 (“The parties hereby
expressly waive any right they may have to a trial by jury for any dispute arising out of or related
to this agreement.”) (capitalization omitted).
88See, e.g., cases cited supra note 1.
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Another transactions-cost hypothesis for the paucity of jury trial waivers
would accept that jury trial waivers are important enough for lawyers to
consider, but that the lawyers lack access at reasonable cost to information
necessary for a well-informed judgment about whether to waive juries. Thus
their failure to waive jury trials may provide no new information. It is cer-
tainly true, as noted above, that disagreement exists among informed
opinion about the value of juries. Yet business lawyers who simply accept
received wisdom should follow publicly expressed attitudes within the busi-
ness community and preclude juries altogether. The fact they do not—and
in fact reject juries far less than half the time—suggests that they may be
acting according to some reliable information that juries often do enhance
the value of commercial contracts.
Finally, strategic factors should also be considered in assessing the
degree to which the low rate of jury trial waivers in our sample is evidence of
the economic value of juries in commercial cases. For example, it could be
that transaction costs associated with jury trial are desired by the parties as
penalties against too-easy breaches of contract.89
Notwithstanding these caveats, we believe that the behavior of sophis-
ticated contacting parties with respect to jury trial waivers provides informa-
tion pertinent to the debate about the value of civil juries in commercial
cases. Our data showing that such parties more often than not fail to opt out
of jury trials suggest that the availability of a jury trial often enhances the
joint welfare of the contracting parties. Thus, our data provide evidence that
juries often provide economic value for the parties and for society as a whole,
quite apart from other reasons that may exist for the institution of the civil
jury.90 If some of the world’s best-advised, most sophisticated legal actors
implicitly recognize juries’ value, the case for anti-jury legal reform is
weakened.
89See, e.g., Maurits Barendrecht & Berend R. de Vries, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss with Sticky
Defaults: Failure on the Market for Dispute Resolution Services? 7 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 83
(2005); David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking
Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 61 (2005).
90See, e.g., Hans, The Contested Role, supra note 78, at 248 (observing that at a time when the
balance between corporate and individual responsibility is in flux, juries “reflect community
notions of both individual and corporate responsibility,” respond to changing norms, and
convey information about the public’s vision of sound corporate conduct).
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B. Explaining the Pattern of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses
Although jury trial waivers are relatively rare, they are strongly associated
with type of contract. The high rates of waiver in credit commitments and
security agreements may reflect lender beliefs that juries are more likely than
judges to impose lender liability. The low rate in employment contracts may
reflect doubt about underlying enforceability in contests between large cor-
porations and individuals. The low rates of waiver in the least standardized
contracts—employment, licensing, and settlements—may suggest that
jurors’ perspectives are especially valued when problems of contract inter-
pretation are likely to be less mechanical. Perhaps the parties value juries’
perceived inclination to avoid strict contractual interpretations when they
perceive themselves as possibly unfairly suffering from such interpretations.
A striking result is the 80 percent rate of jury trial waivers in contracts
designating Illinois as a litigation forum. This far exceeds the waiver rate in
other large, commercially important states. Two factors appear to contribute
to this result. First, Figure 4 and the related discussion indicate that Illinois
has an extremely long difference in time to adjudication between jury trials
and bench trials. Jury trials take substantially longer to adjudicate in
Chicago, relative to bench trials, than the relative time they take in other
places. Although the difference in jury and bench trial time of adjudication
did not help explain the overall pattern of jury trial waivers, the difference
likely does contribute to the Illinois result. Second, Figure 3 suggests that
large corporations perceive Illinois juries to be among the least fair. The
combination of efficiency and fairness factors may explain the high Illinois
jury trial waiver rate.91
We are mindful that, like our study of arbitration clauses,92 this is the
first study of its kind and it is important to recognize its limitations. The
contracts we study exist in a narrow time period. Ideally, we would like
information for periods before and after the first half of 2002. The variation
91Also of interest at the individual-state level is the fairly high rate of jury trial waiver clauses in
Georgia. See Figure 3. This is noteworthy because Georgia’s highest court in 1994 found such
waivers to be unenforceable. Bank S., N.A. v. Howard, 264 Ga. 339, 444 S.E.2d 799 (1994). Yet
five of nine contracts specifying Georgia as the litigation forum included jury trial waivers.
Perhaps the attorneys who drafted these contracts considered that their clients had little to lose
from a waiver because in the worst case it would simply not be enforced and the litigation would
be treated as if no such waiver had been present.
92Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 16.
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across contract types in the rates of jury trial waiver also suggests that more
information and more sophisticated modeling of the decision to include
waivers could be fruitful. The details of the relations between the contracting
parties and the motivations of those drafting the clauses should be studied.
VII. Conclusion
We present evidence that large corporate actors do not systematically flee
juries even though they have the ability to do so, at low expense, by waiving
jury trials ex ante in their contracts. International contracts also include jury
trial waivers at a surprisingly low rate. Contract types are strongly associated
with jury trial waivers, with the waiver rate ranging from near-zero in bond
indentures, employment contracts, pooling service agreements, and under-
writing contracts to over 50 percent in credit commitments and security
agreements. Parties appear to vary the decision whether to include a choice
of forum in a contract and then to include a jury trial waiver based in part on
the forum chosen. Contracts specifying Illinois as a forum waive jury trials 80
percent of the time while contracts designating New York, California, Texas,
and Florida as a forum do so less than 50 percent of the time. Parties tend to
waiver jury trials more when the forum chosen is perceived to have unfair
juries.
In the simple economic view, our results suggest that juries can add
value to complex commercial adjudication. Contracting parties appear to
consider the desirability of waiving juries, as evidenced by the greater waiver
rates in states that the Chamber of Commerce ranks as having less fair juries.
Failure to waive jury trials is therefore not accidental; the parties likely assign
a positive value to the availability of jury trial. Because predispute jury trial
waivers occur ex ante, their relative infrequency provides evidence that juries
may often confer social as well as private benefits as compared with the
available alternatives of fact finding by judges or arbitrators.
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Appendix: Jury Trial Waiver by Whether Forum
Specified and Contract Type
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Sources: BJS data on trial outcomes in 46 large counties, 2001; SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS
EDGAR PLUS database, January 2002 to June 30, 2002 for all contract types other than mergers
and January 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
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